that perspective for the unresolved heterarchical configuration or the open-ended jurisdictional extension of a constitutionalism decoupled from a singular legal and political order.
In the second place, and conversely, traces of constitutionalism beyond the state may be viewed not as an extension and mutation that will ultimately take the form of a new and encompassing unity, but, just as in the classic age of the Westphalian state system, as a series of separate reductions. On this view, constitutional pluralism turns out to be nothing more than constitutional plurality.
That is to say, the flip-side of the structural tendency of constitutional framing to provide the bounded and hierarchically ordered legal space of the state may be that if anything is to escape such a space but still be considered as properly 'constitutional' in character, it can only do so on the basis of its belonging to a quite distinct and unconnected bounded and hierarchically ordered constitutional entity. For if constitutional norms operate according to a singular and hierarchical regulatory logic, then there is simply no conceptual scope for any heterarchical legal relations that operate between distinct constitutional singularities its own properly and distinctly constitutional character, or at least not from the perspective of these constitutional singularities themselves . In other words, if we seek to distinguish the overlapping and interlocking of constitutional orders from mere constitutional plurality or diversity on the basis that it involves a commitment to the common recognition and accommodation -and to that extent the integrity -of the diverse parts notwithstanding their diversity, then the exhaustiveness of each of the different constitutional orders in their own terms means that we lack a constitutional code that operates independently of the overlapping and interlocking constitutional orders in which any such relations between the constitutional orders of states and that of the supranational EU, or between NAFTA and the states of North America, or the UN and the states of the world, or amongst the various emergent non-state polities, or whether we revert our gaze to the 'old-fashioned' terms of exchange between different states themselves, therefore, on this view the idea of constitutional relations between distinct constitutional orders is simply incoherent.
In the third place, if and to the extent that it is nevertheless possible to think of relations between different legal entities as pluralist in quality, and not simply collapsing into either the monolithic discipline of constitutional singularity or the mutual indifference of constitutional plurality, then this may be precisely because the entities in question do not possess or claim just such a constitutional character. If we want to conceive of different legal entities within the increasingly fragmented global archipelago as connected in ways which remain legally meaningful without these legal relations resulting in such entities being ultimately subsumed within a single legal order, the development of the requisite legal imaginary may only be possible if 10 There are in fact two closely related if apparently quite distinct versions of this concern or criticism. One -closely associated with a certain type of approach which remains presumptively sympathetic to constitutional pluralism -raises the prospect that there is simply nothing left to say in constitutional, or indeed in any kind of legal terms, about the relations between constitutional orders which are each already conceived of in a bounded manner. Here, the danger is that constitutional pluralism is left conceptually barren. This so-called radical pluralist approach is further considered in Section 2 of the text below. A second criticism, presumptively unsympathetic to constitutional pluralism, holds that an acceptance of the pluralist scenario is likely to lead not to a conceptual void in the law, and so to a domain of non-law, but to a situation of overabundance. For if constitutional pluralism simply alerts us to a plurality of legal order unities, then rather than an absence of legal answers to difficult questions in areas of overlapping jurisdiction what we have, strictly speaking, are too many answers, each valid from its own systemic perspective. Which law happens to prevail in practice becomes a matter of circumstance rather than principle, and the law as a whole in the area of contested overlap may thus come to lack predictability or a coherent framework of justification. See e.g. J. Baquero Cruz, "The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement" (2008) 14 European Law Journal 389; P. Eletheriadis, "Pluralism and Integrity" (2010) 23 Ratio Juris (forthcoming).
we dispense with the constraining and increasingly anachronistic language of constitutionalism as an appropriate characterization of such entities.
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To recap then, constitutional pluralism may be rejected either on the basis that its pluralist credentials do not add up -that it is ultimately either monism with new horizons or mere plurality -or on the basis that if it is genuinely pluralistic then this is at the expense of its specifically constitutional quality. Taken together, these three challenges introduce a formidable range of arguments against constitutional pluralism in the new global context. In what follows, I will examine how different theories of the global regulatory configuration stand in relation to constitutional pluralism and its critique -whether as explicit advocates of one or more of the three key challenges to constitutional pluralism, or at least as assuming a position consistent with such challenges; or as taking a position that invites one or more of such challenges; or as actively addressing and responding to such challenges.. Before doing so, however, I
want to say something about the implications of the fact that constitutional pluralism was first developed in the European supranational theatre rather than in the wider global arena. On the one hand, the particular terms of the European debate accounted for much of the early buoyancy of constitutional pluralist thinking and for its readiness to rise to the sceptical challenge. On the other hand, by developing the theoretical perspective of constitutional pluralism in conditions that were unusually favourable, this regional concentration has skewed the terms of debate. And in so doing it has retarded -or at least left untested -the capacity of constitutional pluralist thinking to confront the full weight of the sceptical challenge in the wider global context. Nevertheless, I will argue in the concluding sections that, for all its over- 
Constitutional Pluralism in Europe
The idea of constitutional pluralism derived a lot of its initial focus and momentum from the circumstances of high-profile constitutional clashes over the implications of Europe's supranational arrangements. The key sites of these clashes were the supreme or constitutional courts of the member states. and conditions of final constitutional authority in contexts where the states and the EU palpably possessed overlapping competence. And in so doing, these national courts have tended to affirm or to develop conceptions of constitutionalism which, in stressing or assuming the autochthonous quality of state constitutional authority and the national distinctiveness of its content, have been prepared to countenance the claims to authority emanating from the judicial organs of the EU only on their own nationally conditional terms and not on the absolute terms set or assumed by the EU itself As an account of these cases and of their context of emergence and reception, constitutional pluralism has an immediate plausibility. If we take the three core challenges in turn, to each the European case has offered a strong prima facie answer.
In the first place, the European example is one where, whatever fears may be expressed in different quarters about the overweening 'constitutional' ambitions either of the member states or of the EU itself, the diversely-sourced and wide-ranging invocation of the language and logic of constitutionalism in the face of legal and political contestation shows no realistic prospect of being resolved in terms of a newly minted, widely accepted and broadly effective constitutional unity. The relevant organs of the EU remain implacable in their own claims to self-standing authority, but equally, the relevant constitutional organs of the 27 member states continue to make plausible and robust claims to their own original and final constitutional authority for all matters within their national purview, including the jointly designed supranational edifice.
16 16 In an earlier article I coined the term 'epistemic pluralism' to emphasize the fact that 'descriptive pluralism' in the European context had a deep, hermeneutic quality. That is to say, pluralism is appropriate here not just as an external description of the constitutional landscape, but is corroborated and reinforced by the deepest role self-understanding of the key actors themselves; see N. Walker n6 above.
In the second place, however, this does not mean that the European supranational domain is easily categorized merely as a plurality of constitutional unities without a plausibly constitutional connection. Institutionally, we can point to a number of bridging mechanisms which in the round provide more intimate terms of have a constitution at all. In other words, for the most part the focus has been on which of various diverse or graduated conceptions of constitutionalism is appropriate rather than on the threshold applicability of very constitutional concept. the international order in a 'constitution-like' way. Whether due to their generative capacity, or their trumping quality, or their comprehensive reach, they stand apart from and above other international rules and lend some measure of coherence and integrity to the whole.
We should be careful not to overstate the unifying ambition of any of these brands of global constitutionalism. They are far from suggesting a world state to subsume and replace the category of nation states, and, indeed, rarely propose any kind of top-loaded federal design. 37 As noted, their impulse tends to be reactive rather 50 See Krisch, n11 above "The Case for Pluralism"; see also Rosenfeld, n29 above 51 commitment to particular polities and sites of authority with a belief in an overarching normative framework which informs the terms of our various particular manifestations of public authority. In the final analysis, the global division of the world into particular polities remains inevitable but the particular form that such a division takes is not so; rather, it is contingent upon shifts in the underlying circuits of social and economic power. One author who has posed these questions more keenly and insistently than most is Nico Krisch. 55 For him, it seems that constitutionalism in a global age is caught in a Procrustean dilemma. On the one hand, the kind of "foundational constitutionalism" 56 well-known from the state tradition -the 'thick' variant based upon the constituent power of the collective people living in a distinct all-embracing political society -simply does not suit the more fragmented circumstances of the global age. On the other hand, if we try to stretch and adapt constitutionalism to fit 55 See references at n11 above. 56 Krisch, n11 above, "Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition" these new conditions we are faced with a series of unsatisfactory alternatives. Either, in a first case, we retain something of the monistic legacy of constitutionalism -a holistic architectural or (at least) intellectual vision which, in its excessive ambition and self-assertion, lacks both legitimacy and plausibility in an age of global diversity.
Or, in a second case, we a guilty of a kind of constitutional dilution or corruption, retaining the term 'constitutional' as an overstated or inappropriate label for an entirely new type of institutional and normative complex. In particular, if, as is the case with the more systemic forms of pluralism, all we retain from the tradition of state constitutionalism is a commitment to various of its 'thin' properties, -juridical autonomy, an institutional formwork of checks and balances, and fundamental rights protection -but without any plausible sense of an authoritative frame for locating these within a single constitutional universe, then perhaps the constitutional label becomes a mere placebo or distorting diversion. That is to say, constitutionalism may become a source of complacency -a false promise and false comfort in a world that no longer bends to its design, or a source of confusion -a category mistake in a world which needs new categories. In either event constitutionalism threatens to become an impediment rather than a guide in the search for optimal solutions to the question of governing new configurations of social power.
This takes us directly to the third challenge and the alternative solutions suggested by that third challenge. For pluralism to make sense as a normative register for the contemporary global order -and bearing in mind the extent to which empirical conditions of global regulation militate against anything other than a pluralist understanding -then perhaps the 'constitutional' descriptor just has to be dropped. As
Krisch himself suggests, in the last analysis constitutionalism and the scale and quality of the pluralist understanding adequate to the global age may simply be irreconcilable. 57 Perhaps, the best way of ensuring the pluralist virtues of mutual contestation, recognition and adaptation and a complex framework of checks and balances, conceived of as a modest framework of co-ordination between relatively autonomous polities, 58 is to detach them from a constitutional discourse which is unsympathetic on either side of this delicate ambition; either in the strength of its traditional championing of the autonomy of the parts or in its effort to conceive of the new in terms of an idea of totality and integrity which also borrows from the old. On the one hand, as a source of doctrine the accumulated arsenal of constitutional thought is treated in an ever more eclectic manner in the global age.
Pluralism and the Constitutional Legacy
Constitutional doctrine is drawn upon for both epistemic and symbolic reasons -as a rich resource of resilient ideas of good governance couched in a language which also happens to carry a distinguished and potentially authority-inspiring legacy. The spread and adaptation well beyond the traditional container of the nation state of tried and tested aspects of constitutional doctrine such as fundamental rights protection, separation of powers and institutional balance, federalism and subsidiarity, due process and natural justice, proportionality and balancing, or 'hard look' doctrines and 57 Ibid. 58 Krisch, n11 above, "The Case for Pluralism" requirements to give good reasons, speaks to a process of widespread "low intensity" 59 dissemination. Constitutionalism becomes a mobile resource, a 'thin' and footloose structure and stylization of norms used to qualify and dignify the emergent sites of a new global regulatory structure of authority without being constitutive of these sites in the 'thick' manner redolent of the nations state. Constitutionalism on this view is a matter of detail, adding an older texture to new governance forms rather than providing a formative inspiration.
On the other hand, we also find constitutionalism used as reference point for we once posed and addressed within a joined-up political container now increasingly arise in a manner so fragmented and loosely coupled that they threaten the very promise of the political as embodying our capacity to make over the world in our own terms. Constitutionalism as imagination thus also functions as a kind of "placeholder" 66 for what is in danger of being lost if we abandon our commitment to think and act as authors of the constitutive conditions of political society -however diverse and complexly intermingled the transnational societal reference of that political society might be -and acts as a continual prompt for us to seek to retain that aspiration, however formidable, and fashion its pursuit to our new circumstances.
Constitutional Pluralism?
66 Koskenniemi, n9 above, 30.
But even if in these ways constitutionalism in general does remain relevant to the global conditions of late modernity, one last important question of language remains. Does the kind of loosely aligned dual-pronged approach to the sustenance of a constitutional discourse suggested here fit well with the particular perspective of constitutional pluralism which provided the starting point for our analysis?
The answer is a mixed one. In one sense constitutional pluralism is a product of the very structure of state-centred political modernity we are trying to look and think beyond. It is an attempt to solve a problem that is becoming outmoded.
Constitutional pluralism, conceived of as idea of a constitutionally relevant connection between self-authorizing constitutional sites, silently assumes something like the statist template of constituent power as the legitimate basis for the selfauthorization of the post-national constitutional sites. If self-authorization increasingly lacks that legitimation, however, the focus of our concern shifts to the broader question of what form of legitimation is possible in place of or in supplementation of site-specific self-authorization. 67 At the same time, with the weakening of the sources of internal, site-specific legitimation, our sense of the constitutional 'closure' of the various sites is reduced, and so in consequence is the puzzle of how such increasingly 'open' sites can relate constitutionally. In other words, the less site-specific we understand constitutional authority to be, the less problematic we conceive constitutional movement across boundaries, and the less sharply framed the original definitive questions of constitutional pluralism appear. 
